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1 INTRODUCTION
Discrete bidding in English auctions is the norm in the real world, although substantial variations in the
exact characteristics of these auctions are observed. In most English auctions, admittedly, the discrete
bids are endogenous, possibly a function of several factors, including number of bidders, (expected)
biddersvaluations, etc. In auctions at Sothebys or Christies, bidding usually advances between 5%
and 10% of the current price level (Rothkopf and Harstad, 1994). However, there are many examples
where the bids are exogenously given. Cassady (1967) gives examples of auctions in which the bid levels
are known, such as the tobacco and livestock auctions in the USA. In wholesale sh markets, ascending
or English (Graham, 1999, p. 181) and descending or Dutch (Guillotreau and Jimenez-Toribio, 2011)
electronic auctions are commonly used, where the former (electronically) replicates the traditional oral
ascending auctions; known discrete bid increments are a common feature in both these auction types
(Carleton, 2000, pp. 10-11).
Milgrom and Weber (1982) analysed a particular version of the English auction, the so-called
Japanese-English Auction (henceforth JEA), commonly known as clock auction, in which the price
of the object increases continuously and the bidders decide to stay or drop out. In real world examples
of JEA, the price actually increases in discrete increments. For example, in the Looe wholesale sh
auction (UK), the increments are anywhere from 1p to 5p or 10p and sometimes di¤erent increments
are used for di¤erent species during the same auction session. Online auction sites, such as eBay, use
variants of such English auctions, adapted to the online world (Bajari and Hortaçsu, 2004), where bid
increments are also discrete (and depend on the price level).
In order to incorporate this common feature of real world English auctions, the set-up in this paper
(as originally presented in Gonçalves and Ray, 2017) is the same as the usual JEA except that the price
goes up in discrete commonly known bid levels. In our game, as in the usual JEA, if a bidder wants to
drop out, all he has to do is release the button. The nal auction price is equal to the highest bid level
at which at least one bidder was active. We use the so-called wallet gamewith two bidders (in which
the common value of the good is simply the sum of two private signals, the amounts in the wallets
of each bidder), introduced by Klemperer (1998), as our background common game to theoretically
analyse a JEA with discrete bid levels. Klemperer (1998) illustrated that bidding twice the individual
signal forms the unique symmetric (Bayesian-Nash) equilibrium in this game. However, with discrete
bid levels, Gonçalves and Ray (2017) proved that one cannot construct a symmetric equilibrium using
strategies analogous (in a discrete bids environment) to bidding twice the private signal. Our aim
here is thus to theoretically characterise the equilibria of a JEA in a common value environment with
exogenously specied discrete bid levels.
There are real-life examples that (sort of) t our model. In eBay, it is not all that rare to specify
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that bids cannot start below a given price, say, $49, and must be a multiple of $1 with the last digit 9;
however, the assumption of a commonly known upper limit does not hold there.1 Bidding at the online
auction site QXL was also quite similar to our model: the price went up in predetermined increments
and if bids were not a multiple of that increment, then the bid was rounded down to the closest multiple
of the increment. QXL bidding increments depended on the bid value; for example, for bids in the
$2:50 $9:99 range, the bid increment was $0:10 while for bids in the $10 $99:99, it was $1:00 and
so on.
In the recent past, English auctions with predened discrete bid levels have been analysed (Rothkopf
and Harstad, 1994; Yu, 1999; Sinha and Greenleaf, 2000; Cheng, 2004; David et al, 2007; Isaac et al,
2007); for example, Yu (1999), in a private value setting with discrete bid increments, found multiple
equilibria: depending on whether biddersvaluations are above (or below) certain thresholds, the bid-
ders choose di¤erent (equilibrium) strategies. However, we note that the existing (above-mentioned)
literature on discrete bids for single object auctions has focussed entirely on private value environments;
virtually nothing has been done for the common value model. There is a vast literature on both multi-
object and multi-unit auctions, some of which considers discrete bidding (see, for example, Brusco and
Lopomo, 2002; Ausubel, 2004; Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn, 2005). However, this literature also
mainly refers to private values; for example, Ausubel (2004) modeled the auction increments through a
price clock with either integer (steps) or continuous increases. Interestingly, and of relevance to our pa-
per, Ausubel (2004) used discrete increments only in the private values case while the proposed (novel)
ascending auction under an interdependent value formulation (a generalisation of both the private and
common value models) is analysed under continuous bid increments.
Following the seminal experiment by Avery and Kagel (1997) on a continuous-bid JEA based on the
wallet game, Gonçalves and Hey (2011) studied discrete bids in an experiment; however there has been
no attempt to analyse the equilibria for this game theoretically apart from the recent contribution by
Gonçalves and Ray (2017). Following their work, we are now taking the rst step to fully characterise
the set of equilibria for the wallet game in a JEA with discrete bids.
In this paper, we show that (symmetric) partition equilibria, involving weakly increasing strategies
based on elements of a partition of the signal space, exist for the wallet game in a JEA with discrete bid
levels. Such partition equilibria may be pooling or separating (depending on the number of partitions).
We illustrate several such equilibria with only two or three discrete bid levels (with certain parametric
restrictions). These equilibria, however, yield a lower expected revenue for the seller than in the case
of a continuous JEA. Despite this, we further show that a revenue-maximising second best solution for
this set-up exists; that is, the seller may choose these bid levels optimally to maximise the revenue.
These results are, in our opinion, interesting and novel from a theoretical viewpoint, but also are of
1We thank Ron Harstad for providing this example.
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practical interest for real world auctions. First, our partition equilibria with discrete bid levels suggest
that (expected) sellers revenue may be lower than in a continuous JEA. By adequately choosing both
the number and the values of discrete bid levels, the seller may minimise this loss. Naturally, the
seller also benets from discrete bid levels in ways that our model does not capture. For instance, the
auction-speed may be higher which is an important variable to consider when auctioning certain goods.
In addition, by denition, JEA preclude the possibility of jump-bidding equilibria, which could hurt the
auctioneer (Avery, 1998; Isaac et al, 2007).
Second, the (symmetric) partition equilibria that we nd may appear to be complex in the way they
are calculated, but they do point to very simple rule-of-thumb strategies that bidders may resort to: for
example, with two discrete bid levels, if the signal is higher than a threshold, bid high; otherwise, bid
low. The experimental literature on ascending auctions presents multiple (similar in nature) examples
of simple strategies that are actually played (for instance, see Kagel, 1995; Kagel and Levin, 2016),
although in most of those cases, such strategies are not equilibrium strategies, whilst our partition
equilibria strategies would be. In that context, our results may, in a way, bridge the divide between
theoretical and experimental work on ascending auctions.
2 MODEL
We consider the model originally presented in Gonçalves and Ray (2017).
2.1 Game (Gonçalves and Ray, 2017)
For the sake of completeness, we present the features of the game in Gonçalves and Ray (2017) in this
subsection.
Consider the wallet game with two symmetric risk-neutral bidders i 2 f1; 2g bidding for one single
good with common value, ~V . Each bidder receives an independent and uniformly distributed2 private
signal xi  U (0; 1), i = 1; 2. The (ex ante) unknown common value of the good is simply the sum of
the two signals: ~V = x1 + x2.
We use the JEA with some exogenously xed discrete bids that are the elements of the set A =
fa1; :::; akg, with 0 < a1 < ::: < ak < 2, k  2 a nite integer; the set A is common knowledge to the
bidders. We will denote a typical bid level by aj , for j = 1; :::; k, with the implicit assumption that
a0 = 0 and ak+1 = 2, for notational convenience whenever required in this paper.
In the JEA we consider, the price goes up in discrete bid levels in the set A starting from a1 and
ending at ak. The bidders have to keep pressing a button at each bid level to be actively bidding; a
2As in Gonçalves and Ray (2017), we take the uniform distribution as it is easier to analyse, however, any other specic
distribution could have been considered.
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bidder drops out of the auction at any stage by releasing the button. The nal auction price is equal
to the highest bid level in which at least one bidder was active. Therefore, for any j = 1; :::; k   1, if
one bidder is active at aj but not at aj+1 while his opponent is active at aj+1, then the latter wins
the auction and pays a price equal to aj+1; if both bidders are active at aj , but not at aj+1, then the
auction winner is decided at random with equal probabilities and the nal price is aj ; nally, if both
bidders are active at the last bid level ak, the winner will be chosen at random with equal probabilities
and will pay the price ak. The net payo¤ to the (selected) winner in each of the above cases is the
realised value of x1 + x2 minus the price to pay while the payo¤ to the loser is 0. If no bidder is active
at a1, then the auction ends immediately and the payo¤ to either bidder is 0.
A strategy in this Bayesian game is therefore to choose (as in Gonçalves and Ray, 2017) a drop out
bid level as a function of the signal. Given a signal x 2 (0; 1), a bidding strategy for a player thus
chooses 0 (which implies that the bidder is not active even at a1) or a bid level aj so that the bidder
will be active at aj but not at aj+1, where j = 1; :::; k (with ak+1 = 2). A typical strategy is denoted
by  that is a function b(x) 2 f0; a1; :::; akg implying that the player with signal x is active until b(x).
As in Gonçalves and Ray (2017), the above JEA for the wallet game with k bid levels (a1; ::; ak) will
henceforth be called Gk.
2.2 Strategies
In this subsection, we look at possible strategies of Gk. The following denitions are new concepts (not
present in Gonçalves and Ray, 2017) needed for the analysis in this paper.
Denition 1 A strategy  = b(x) for Gk is weakly increasing (decreasing) if for all pair of signals x
and y, x > y, b(x) () b(y).
Theoretically, there are strategies that are neither weakly increasing nor weakly decreasing. For
example, consider a strategy rat for which b(x) = am, when x is a rational number and b(x) = an,
otherwise for some m and n.
Understandably, bidders may not wish to use the strategy 0. Formally,
Denition 2 A strategy is called active if it never chooses 0 for any signal, i.e., the bidder is active at
least at a1 for any signal x. A strategy is called inactive if it chooses 0 for at least one signal, i.e., the
bidder is inactive even at a1 for some signal x.
A natural type of strategy one may think of is a strategy that divides the domain of the signal x,
the interval (0; 1), into (l+1) subintervals or elements of a partition using l ( 1) many cut-o¤ signals.
In the rest of the paper, we (ab)use the word partitionsto mean elements of a partition.
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Denition 3 A partition strategy for Gk is a strategy that uses l ( 1) cut-o¤ points and thus (l + 1)
partitions of the interval (0; 1), and chooses an element from the set f0; a1; :::; akg for each of these
partitions.
Note that l = 0, which implies no cut-o¤ signal and therefore no partition, also generates a feasible
strategy; in such a strategy, only one bid level is picked for the whole set of signals, the interval (0; 1).
Denition 4 In Gk, a strategy is called a babbling strategy, if regardless of the signal, the bidder
chooses either 0 or a particular bid level aj, j = 1; :::; k, i.e., for any x 2 (0; 1), b(x) = c for some
c 2 f0; a1; :::; akg. In an active babbling strategy, b(x) = c for some c 2 fa1; :::; akg, for all x 2 (0; 1).
b(x) = 0, for all x 2 (0; 1) is the inactive babbling strategy.
Obviously, there are strategies that are not partition strategies; for example, the above mentioned
rat is not a partition strategy. Also, a partition strategy may be neither weakly increasing nor weakly
decreasing. For example, consider G2 with two bid levels, L and H and think of a strategy written
using two cut-o¤s x and y as:
 =
8>>><>>>:
L if x  x
H if x < x  y
L if x > y
We now focus on a specic subset of the strategy sets in Gk and make the following assumption.
Assumption 0. All the bidders use weakly increasing partition strategies only.
The JEA for the wallet game with k bid levels (a1; ::; ak) with weakly increasing partition strategies
only is our baseline game and we henceforth call it G0k.
A non-babbling strategy in any G0k can be written in terms of some cut-o¤ signals x

c , c = 1; :::; l,
where 0 < x1 < ::: < x

l < 1 and l  k that divide the interval (0; 1) into (l+1) partitions and associates
an element of f0; a1; :::; akg to each partition in an increasing order. Such a non-babbling strategy, ,
can be easily associated with a certain probability distribution over the set f0; a1; :::; akg, as determined
by the partition(s). A babbling strategy is clearly associated with a degenerate distribution (probability
1 on one element of the set f0; a1; :::; akg).
In the following subsection we formally dene an equilibrium of the game G0k, with k  2, using the
standard notion of Bayesian-Nash equilibrium with usual expected payo¤s.
2.3 Partition Equilibria
In this subsection, we characterise di¤erent kinds of equilibria using partition strategies. We further
focus on active partition strategies to nd equilibria in G0k, with k  2. Clearly, using Denitions 1, 2
and 3, for any active weakly increasing partition strategy the number of cut-o¤s, l, must satisfy l  k 1.
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Denition 5 For any k  2, an active weakly increasing partition strategy with l many cut-o¤s is called
separating if l = k   1,
Clearly, for k = 2, an active weakly increasing partition strategy is either babbling or separating
with a single cut-o¤.
Denition 6 For k > 2, an active weakly increasing partition strategy with l many cut-o¤s is called
pooling if 1  l < k   1.
Denition 7 In G0k, where k > 2, a separating strategy is an active weakly increasing partition strategy
that uses k   1 cut-o¤s (x1; :::; xk 1) and thereby k partitions; it can be written as:
 =
8>>><>>>:
a1 if x  x1
aj if xj 1 < x  xj , j = 2; :::; k   1
ak if x > xk 1
In G02, with 2 bid levels (a1; a2) and one cut-o¤ x
, a separating strategy  can be written as:  =
a1 if x  x and a2 otherwise.3
Similarly, one may also formally dene and express any pooling strategy, in G0k, with k > 2, using l
(< k   1) cut-o¤s.
As mentioned earlier, a non-babbling partition strategy, , can be interpreted as a probability
distribution. For example, for k > 2, the separating strategy in Denition 5 above is a strategy in which
the bidder chooses a1 with probability x1, aj with probability (x

j   xj 1), j = 2; :::; k   1 and ak with
probability
 
1 
k 1P
j=1
xj
!
. The probabilities for a pooling strategy can also be similarly identied.
We may now dene a partition equilibrium, using the above partition strategies. As mentioned earlier,
we are going to consider symmetric equilibria only. An equilibrium in symmetric partition (babbling)
strategies is a strategy prole in which both bidders play the same partition (babbling) strategy.
A symmetric separating (pooling) partition equilibrium can be characterised by a separating (pool-
ing) strategy with usual (Bayesian-Nash) equilibrium conditions. The equilibrium conditions are: i:
indi¤erence at the cut-o¤s, ii: incentive constraints for each partition, iii: activation constraint (active
at a1) which implies the participation constraint (at the beginning of the auction) and iv: feasibility
constraints for the cut-o¤ points. One can thus dene and characterise such a partition equilibrium
using these conditions.
Denition 8 In G0k, a symmetric strategy prole (1; 2) is called a separating equilibrium if each
bidder i uses the same separating strategy i with k   1 cut-o¤s (x1; :::; xk 1) with all of the following
3 In this denition, we have used, without any loss of generality, the weak inequality on the left hand side of the cut-o¤
(as the signal is generated using a continuous distribution). One may dene a partition strategy with the weak inequality
on the right hand side of the cut-o¤ in which case the following equilibrium analysis needs to be modied accordingly.
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conditions satised.4
u1 (aj ; 2)jx1=xj = u1 (aj+1; 2)jx1=xj ; j = 1; :::; k   1 [indi¤erence conditions]
u1 (a1; 2) > u1 (ah; 2) if x1  x1; h > 1 [incentive constraint for the rst partition]
u1 (ak; 2) > u1 (ah; 2) if x1 > xk 1; h < k [incentive constraint for the last partition]
u1 (aj ; 2) > u1 (ah; 2) if xj 1 < x1  xj ; j = 2; :::; k   1; h 6= j [incentive constraints for all other
partitions, needed only for k > 2]
u1 (a1; 2)  u1 (0; 2) = 0 if x1  x1 [activation constraint] implying u1 (a1; 2)jx1=0  0 [partici-
pation constraint]
0 < x1 < ::: < x

k 1 < 1 [feasibility constraints]
Similarly, one may write down the equilibrium conditions for a (symmetric) pooling equilibrium5 or
even a (symmetric) babbling equilibrium. The conditions for a babbling equilibrium clearly involve just
the incentive constraint and the participation constraint.
3 RESULTS
We focus only on symmetric equilibria for the game G0k, with k  2, in the rest of our paper. As it is
well-known, the symmetric (Bayesian-Nash) equilibrium for the JEA with continuous bids is given by
bid functions bi (xi) = 2xi, i = 1; 2, as derived by Milgrom and Weber (1982), in a general model, and
later specically for the wallet game by Klemperer (1998) and Avery and Kagel (1997). Gonçalves and
Ray (2017) proved that this twice-signal biddingstrategy is not an equilibrium in Gk (and therefore
not in G0k either). Although twice-signal bidding is not an equilibrium G
0
k, we will show that other
equilibria exist for our game in the next subsection.
Unfortunately, it is extremely di¢ cult to analytically solve the above set of constraints (as in Den-
ition 8) and thereby nd all partition equilibria for G0k, particularly when k is not small. The analysis
is understandably easier for G02 or G
0
3. In the next subsection, we will consider G
0
2 and G
0
3 and show
examples of symmetric partition equilibria in such games.
3.1 Separating Equilibrium in G02
Consider any given G02; let us denote the bid levels by L (low) and H (high); that is, k = 2 with a1 = L
and a2 = H.
Any separating strategy here can be written in terms of a cut-o¤ signal x; a separating strategy for
some x, 0 < x < 1, is thus:
4Abusing notations for the expected payo¤ from a partition strategy.
5We do understand that our use of the phrase pooling equilibrium is not standard in the literature.
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2S =
8<: L if x  xH if x > x
In a symmetric separating equilibrium, each bidder thus plays L with probability x (the probability
that x  x) and H with probability (1  x), that is, the strategy 2S can be associated with the
distribution (x; 1  x) over L and H. Further, to construct an equilibrium, we make the following
assumption on the values of L and H.
Assumption 1. L < 12 and L+
1
2 < H <
3
4 +
L
2 .
Note that Assumption 1 in turn impliesH < 1. We are now ready to present a separating equilibrium
of this game.
Proposition 1 Under Assumption 1, the separating strategy 2S = (x; 1  x), with x = 2H 12(1+L H) ,
constitutes a symmetric separating equilibrium of G02.
Proof. We rst compute the (expected) payo¤s for a bidder from the partition strategy prole;
without loss of generality, we consider bidder 1. When bidder 2 has a signal x2  x and bids L; using
the uniform distribution, bidder 1 expects bidder 2 to have a signal realisation equal to x=2; similarly,
when bidder 2 has a signal x2 > x and bids H, bidder 1 expects bidder 2 to have a signal realisation
equal to (1 + x) =2.
Bidder 1s expected payo¤s thus are given by: u1
 
L; 2S

= x: 12 (x1 +
x
2   L) + (1   x):0 and
u1
 
H;2S

= x:(x1 + x

2  H) + (1  x) : 12 :(x1 + 1+x

2  H).
Setting the indi¤erence condition (as in Denition 8) u1
 
L; 2S

= u1
 
H;2S

, we get x =
2x1+1 2H
2(H L) , which implies that when x1 = x
, u1
 
L; 2S

= u1
 
H;2S

provided x = 2H 12(1+L H) .
Substituting this cut-o¤ x in the expected payo¤s, we obtain
u1
 
L; 2S
  u1  H;2S = 14 2H 1 2x1(1+L H)1+L H = 12 (x   x1).
Hence, for bidder 1, if x1 > x, we have u1
 
H;2S

> u1
 
L; 2S

, that is, with a high signal
realisation (above x), bidder 1 prefers to bid H, and when x1  x, we have u1
 
L; 2S

> u1
 
H;2S

,
that is, with a low signal realisation (below x), bidder 1 prefers to bid L, which conrms the desired
equilibrium condition (incentive constraint as in Denition 8).
We now have to conrm the feasibility constraint that x 2 (0; 1); this is guaranteed by Assumption
1 as x > 0, H > 1=2 and x < 1, H < 34 + L2 .
Finally, we need to check the activation (and thus the participation) constraint that the payo¤s
cannot be negative (otherwise bidders would prefer not to be active) at L. As u1
 
L; 2S

is increasing
in x1, we just need to ensure that u1
 
L; 2S

x1=0
= (1 2H)(1+2L)(2L+1 H)
16(H L 1)2 > 0.
The above is indeed true; the denominator is always positive and for the numerator to be positive
we must have either H < 1=2 and H < L+1=2, which we disregard because it would not yield a positive
cut-o¤ x, or we must have H > 1=2 and H > L+ 1=2, which is guaranteed under Assumption 1.
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It is also easy to show that the above partition equilibrium is indeed unique (in weakly increasing
symmetric strategies). Clearly, there are only two potential candidate proles which are based on two
babbling strategies of staying active until L or H regardless of the signal. We denote these proles by
(L;L) and (H;H) respectively and prove that neither of them is an equilibrium.
Corollary 1 Under Assumption 1, the separating strategy prole (2S ; 2S), where, 2S = (x; 1  x),
with x = 2H 12(1+L H) , is the unique symmetric (Bayesian-Nash) equilibrium of G
0
2.
Proof. To show uniqueness, we just need to prove that (L;L) and (H;H) cannot be an equilibrium.
To prove that (L;L) cannot be an equilibrium, we note that there are realisations of x1 for bidder 1 for
which bidding L is not a best response against L. To see this, take 1 > x1 > 1  2( 34 + L2  H). In this
case, u1 (H;L) u1 (L;L) = (x1+ 12 H)  12 (x1+ 12 L) > 0 (as, by Assumption 1, 1 2( 34+ L2  H) < 1).
Similarly, we prove that (H;H) cannot be an equilibrium by showing that there are realisations of x1
for bidder 1 for which bidding H is not a best response against H. To see this, take 0 < x1 < H   1=2.
Here, u1 (L;H)  u1 (H;H) = 12 (H   12   x1) > 0.
The above results thus fully characterise the equilibrium of any G02 satisfying Assumption 1, as the
following example illustrates.
Example 1 Consider two specic values for L and H, namely, L = 1=5 and H = 4=5, satisfying
Assumption 1. In this case, from Proposition 2, we have x = 3=4. Hence, in the unique symmetric
equilibrium of this game, a bidder is active at L (but not at H) if and only if the signal is less than or
equal to 3=4. Bidder is payo¤, ui, from this equilibrium strategy prole is given by ui = 38xi +
21
320 if
xi  3=4 (in which case bidder i plays L) and ui = 78xi   99320 if xi > 3=4 (in which case bidder i plays
H).
3.2 Pooling Equilibria in G03
Now we consider G03 to provide some examples of pooling equilibria. Let us denote three bid levels by
L (low), M (medium) and H (high); that is, k = 3 with a1 = L, a2 = M and a3 = H. We illustrate
three di¤erent types of pooling equilibria with three bid levels in the following subsections.
3.2.1 Illustration 1
In this illustration, we use the parameter values from the previous subsection (G02) and extend it to a
specic G03. We take any values of L and H satisfying Assumption 1 and call them L andM respectively
(Assumption 10 below) and make a further assumption (Assumption 2) on H as below, to construct a
pooling equilibrium.
Assumption 10. L < 12 and L+
1
2 < M <
3
4 +
L
2 .
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Assumption 2. H > 34 +
M
2 +
2M 1
8(1+L M) .
Clearly, Assumption 1
0
is same as Assumption 1 with renamed parameters. We now construct a
pooling equilibrium using the same cut-o¤ as in Proposition 2. Let us consider the following partition
strategy:
3P1 =
8<: L if x  xM if x > x
Clearly the above strategy is a pooling strategy as the bid level H is not used. In a symmetric
prole, each bidder plays L with probability x and M with probability (1  x), that is, the strategy
3P1 can be associated with the distribution (x; 1  x; 0) over L, M and H. We now prove that this
strategy prole is an equilibrium for this game (following the proof of Proposition 2).
Proposition 2 Under Assumptions 1
0
and 2, the partition strategy 3P1 = (x; 1   x; 0), with x =
2M 1
2(1+L M) , constitutes a symmetric pooling equilibrium of G
0
3.
Proof. We rst compute bidder 1s expected payo¤s under this partition strategy prole which
turns out to be:
u1
 
L; 3P1

= x 12

x1 +
x
2   L

; u1
 
M;3P1

= x

x1 +
x
2  M

+(1  x) 12

x1 +
1+x
2  M

.
The indi¤erence condition (as in Denition 8), u1
 
L; 3P1

= u1
 
M;3P1

, is satised provided
x = 2M 12(1+L M) .
Using this cut-o¤, we obtain u1
 
L; 3P1
   u1  M;3P1 = 12 (x   x1); therefore the incentive
constraints u1
 
L; 3P1

> u1
 
M;3P1

if x1 < x (and thus the constraint u1
 
L; 3P1

> u1
 
H;3P1

if x1 < x) and u1
 
M;3P1

> u1
 
L; 3P1

if x1 > x are all satised.
Hence, we just need to prove that bidder 1 does not deviate and play H when x1 > x, that is, we
must have u1
 
H;3P1
  u1  M;3P1 < 0 if x1 > x. Note that u1  H;3P1  u1  M;3P1 = 12x1 +
1+x
4  H+ M2 . Substituting the value of x and setting x1 = 1 (the highest possible signal), we conrm
that this payo¤ di¤erence is indeed negative under Assumption 2 (that is, H > 34 +
M
2 +
2M 1
8(1+L M) ).
Finally, using the proof of Proposition 1, here as well we have the feasibility constraint and the
activation (thus participation) constraint satised.
To illustrate the above, we may use the values in Example 1.
Example 2 Take L = 1=5, M = 4=5 and H = 7=5, satisfying Assumptions 1
0
and 2. As in Example
1, here as well, we have x = 3=4: Thus in this symmetric pooling equilibrium of this game, a bidder is
active at L (but not at M or H) when the signal is less than or equal to 3=4 and active at M (but not
at H) when the signal is bigger than 3=4. Bidder is payo¤, ui, from this equilibrium strategy prole is
given by ui = 38xi +
21
320 if xi  3=4 (in which case bidder i plays L) and ui = 78xi   99320 if xi > 3=4 (in
which case bidder i plays M).
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3.2.2 Illustration 2
In this illustration, we will use di¤erent parameter values to construct another pooling equilibrium for
any given G03; we make the following assumptions.
Assumption 1
00
. L < 12 and 2L < M <
3
4 +
L
2 .
Assumption 3. H = 12 + 2M   L.
Let us consider the following partition strategy:
3P2 =
8<: L if x  xH if x > x
In this pooling strategy the bid level M is not used. Here, the strategy 3P2 can be associated with
the distribution (x; 0; 1  x) over L, M and H. We now prove our next result.
Proposition 3 Under Assumptions 1
00
and 3, the partition strategy 3P2 = (x; 0; 1   x), with x =
4
3M   23L, constitutes a symmetric pooling equilibrium of G03.
Proof. Following Denition 8, we need to show that the equilibrium conditions are satised at these
parameter values.
The indi¤erence condition is met when x = 43M  23L as u1
 
L; 3P2

x1=x
= u1
 
H;3P2

x1=x
=
2(2M L)(M L)
3 .
The activation (and thus participation) constraint is satised by Assumption 1
00
as u1
 
L; 3P2

x1=0
=
2(2M L)(M 2L)
9  0 when M > 2L.
Note that the feasibility constraint 0 < x = 43M   23L < 1 is satised under Assumption 1
00
.
We now need to prove the incentive constraints for the two partitions below and above x.
To do this, take a small " > 0 and x1 such that jx1   xj = ". It is easy to check that at x1,
u1
 
L; 3P2
   u1  H;3P2 is "2 > 0, when x1 < x and is   "2 < 0, when x1 > x. Similarly, at x1,
u1
 
L; 3P2
   u1  M;3P2 is (2M L)"3 > 0, when x1 < x and is (L 2M)"3 < 0, when x1 > x (by
Assumption 1
00
). Finally, when x1 > x, at x1, u1
 
H;3P2
   u1  M;3P2 = (3 4M+2L)6 " > 0 (by
Assumption 1
00
). Thus all the incentive constraints are satised.
We may illustrate the above result now using some specic parameter values.
Example 3 Take L = 1=5, M = 3=5 and H = 3=2, satisfying Assumptions 1
00
and 3. From Proposition
4, we have x = 2=3: Thus in this symmetric pooling equilibrium of this game, a bidder is active at L
(but not at M or H) when the signal is less than or equal to 2=3 and active at H when the signal is
bigger than 2=3. Bidder is payo¤, ui, from this equilibrium strategy prole is given by ui = 13xi +
2
45 if
xi  2=3 (in which case bidder i plays L) and ui = 56xi   1345 if xi > 2=3 (in which case bidder i plays
H).
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3.2.3 Illustration 3
In this illustration, we make the following assumptions on the parameters.
Assumption 4. M < 12 .
Assumption 5. H =M + 12 .
Let us now consider the following partition strategy:
3P3 =
8<: M if x  xH if x > x
In this pooling strategy the bid level L is not used. We may write the above strategy as 3P3 =
(0;x; 1  x). We now prove that this strategy constitutes a symmetric equilibrium for this game.
Proposition 4 Under Assumptions 4 and 5, the partition strategy 3P3 = (0;x; 1 x), with x = 2M ,
constitutes a symmetric pooling partition equilibrium of G03.
Proof. Following Denition 8, we need to show that the equilibrium conditions are satised at these
parameter values.
The indi¤erence condition is satised at x = 2M , as u1
 
M;3P3

x1=x
= u1
 
H;3P3

x1=x
=
M2. The activation (and thus participation) constraint is trivially satised as u1
 
M;3P3

x1=0
= 0.
The feasibility constraint 0 < x = 2M < 1 is met by Assumption 4:
We now need to prove the incentive constraints for the two partitions below and above x. To do
this, as in the proof of Proposition 4, we take a small " > 0 and x1 such that jx1   xj = ". It is easy
to check that at x1, u1
 
M;3P3
  u1  H;3P3 is "2 > 0, when x1 < x and is   "2 < 0, when x1 > x.
Similarly, whenever x1 < x, at x1, u1
 
L; 3P3
 u1  M;3P3 =  M (2M + ") < 0. Finally, whenever
x1 > x
, at x1, u1
 
L; 3P3
  u1  H;3P3 =  2M2  M"  12" < 0. Thus all the incentive constraints
are satised.
We may now illustrate the above result.
Example 4 Take L = 1=10, M = 2=5 and H = 9=10, satisfying Assumptions 4 and 5. From Proposi-
tion 5, we have x = 4=5: Thus in this symmetric pooling equilibrium of this game, a bidder is active at
M (but not at H) when the signal is less than or equal to 4=5 and active at H when the signal is bigger
than 4=5. Bidder is payo¤, ui, from this equilibrium strategy prole is given by ui = 25xi if xi  4=5
(in which case bidder i plays M) and ui = 910xi   25 if xi > 4=5 (in which case bidder i plays H).
3.2.4 Multiple (Pooling) Equilibria
In this subsection, we show that there may exist two pooling equilibria in a given G03 (for given values
of the bid levels), using the illustrations in the previous subsection.
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It is clear that one cannot nd values of three bid levels so that both pooling equilibria (3P1 ; 3P1)
and (3P3 ; 3P3) exist simultaneously (as Assumptions 1 and 4 for values of M are mutually exclusive).
Similarly, one cannot nd values of three bid levels for which both pooling equilibria (3P2 ; 3P2) and
(3P3 ; 3P3) exist (as both Assumptions 3 and 5 cannot be satised by the same value of H).
However it is possible to nd values of the bid levels such that both pooling equilibria (3P1 ; 3P1)
and (3P2 ; 3P2) exist simultaneously.
Note that any values of L and M satisfying Assumption 1
0
will also satisfy Assumption 1
00
as for
any L < 12 , M > L +
1
2 implies M > 2L. Hence, we may nd a set of numerical values for three bid
levels for which two pooling equilibria exist as the following example (similar to Example 2) illustrates.
Example 5 Take a G03 with L = 1=5, M = 4=5 and H = 19=10, satisfying Assumption 1
0
(and thereby
Assumption 1
00
) and Assumptions 2 and 3. In this game, we have two di¤erent pooling equilibria,
(3P1 ; 3P1) and (3P2 ; 3P2), characterised by two di¤erent cut-o¤s, respectively, 3=4 and 14=15. First,
the symmetric pooling partition equilibria, (3P1 ; 3P1) exists (as in Example 2) in which each bidder
is active at L (but not at M or H) when the signal is less than or equal to 3=4 and active at M when
the signal is bigger than 3=4. Bidder is payo¤, ui, from this equilibrium strategy prole is given by
ui =
3
8xi +
21
320 if xi  3=4 (in which case bidder i plays L) and ui = 78xi   99320 if xi > 3=4 (in which
case bidder i plays M). Second, the symmetric pooling partition equilibria, (3P2 ; 3P2) exists in which
each bidder is active at L (but not at M or H) when the signal is less than or equal to 14=15 and active
at H when the signal is bigger than 14=15. Bidder is payo¤, ui, from this equilibrium strategy prole
is given by by ui = 715xi +
28
225 if xi  14=15 (in which case bidder i plays L) and ui = 2930xi   77225
if xi > 14=15 (in which case bidder i plays H). One may compare these two equilibria by their ex-
ante expected payo¤s (for each bidder i) that are respectively 43160 (= 0:26875) for (
3P1 ; 3P1) and 323900
(= 0:35889) for (3P2 ; 3P2); hence, the equilibrium 3P2 is better for the bidders.
3.3 Sellers Expected Revenue
We now focus on the sellers expected revenue from all the equilibria stated in the previous subsections.
3.3.1 Revenue in G02
Consider the separating equilibrium (2S ; 2S) as presented in Proposition 1. The expected revenue
for the seller from this equilibrium is given by L when both players play L (occurs with probabil-
ity (x)2) and H in all other cases (i.e., when at least one bidder bids H). Thus the sellers ex-
pected revenue (R2S) is: R2S = (x) (x)L+ (x) (1  x)H + (1  x) (x)H + (1  x) (1  x)H =
L+4LH 4LH2+3H 4H2+4HL2
4(1+L H)2 .
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We observe that for all values of L and H satisfying our assumption, the sellers expected revenue is
lower than in a JEA with continuous bids, E

P JEA

= 2=3 (see Avery and Kagel, 1997). The following
gure (Figure 1) displays this result, which is similar to that obtained by Rothkopf and Harstad (1994,
Proposition, p. 575) in a private values setting (insofar as the revenue from a discrete bidding auction
is lower than in its continuous counterpart).
E[PJEA]=2/3
R
Figure 1: Sellers expected revenue for di¤erent bid
levels
Although G02 yields lost revenue compared to the continuous case, it is possible to show that a
second-best solution for the choice of L and H exists in this set-up.
Proposition 5 In the equilibrium (2S ; 2S) as stated in Proposition 1, sellers expected revenue is
maximised when L = 1=4 and H = 3=4, yielding x = 1=2 and R2S

= 5=8.
Proof. In order to obtain the revenue-maximising values of L and H; we need to solve the following
optimisation problem (rearranging the inequality restrictions):
maxL;H R
2S = L+4LH 4LH
2+3H 4H2+4HL2
4(1+L H)2
subject to 1=2  L  0, H   L  1=2  0, 3=4 + L=2 H  0, L  0 and H  0.
We set up the Lagrangian as below, where yi are the multipliers:
Z = L+4LH 4LH
2+3H 4H2+4HL2
4(1+L H)2 + y1 (1=2  L) + y2 (H   L  1=2) + y3 (3=4 + L=2 H)
We are now going to use the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the above Langrangean. First, as we are
looking for L > 0 and H > 0, we have @Z@L = 0 and
@Z
@H = 0. Now, when
@Z
@y2
= H   L   1=2 = 0
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(that is, when H = L+1=2), we have y2 > 0 and the expected revenue is a concave function of L: This
implies @Z@y1 = 1=2  L > 0 and also @Z@y3 = 3=4 + L=2 H > 0, thereby y1 = 0 and y3 = 0.
Thus we have three equations, namely, @Z@L = 0,
@Z
@H = 0 and
@Z
@y2
= 0 that we can solve with respect
to L, H and y2. Solving these, we get L = 1=4 and H = 3=4 (with y2 = 3=4). For these optimal bid
levels, R2S

= 5=8.
In the second best solution, the loss of revenue compared to the JEA with continuous bids is
approximately 6:3%. It is, although signicantly higher than zero, not very high in percentage terms.
3.3.2 Revenue in G03
We now consider the sellers revenue for each of the three pooling equilibria for any given G03 as described
above. For each case, we nd the best parameter values that maximise the corresponding sellers revenue.
First we consider the pooling equilibrium (3P1 ; 3P1) for G03 which is very similar to the separating
equilibrium (2S ; 2S) for G02. The sellers revenue from the equilibrium (
3P1 ; 3P1) is given by:
R3P1 = L+4LM 4LM
2+3M 4M2+4ML2
4(1+L M)2 .
It is obvious that we will have the same values for the parameters that maximise the sellers revenue
here.
Corollary 2 Sellers expected revenue from the equilibrium (3P1 ; 3P1) is maximised when L = 1=4,
M = 3=4 and H = 5=4, yielding x = 1=2 and R3P

1 = 5=8.
Proof. The proof follows immediately from Proposition 5. Given the solutions of the Lagrangean
(as in the proof of Proposition 5) L = 1=4 andM = 3=4; we obtain H = 34+
M
2 +
2M 1
8(1+L M) = 5=4:
For these bid levels, x = 1=2 and R3P

1 = 5=8.
Note that, not surprisingly, R3P

1 = R2S

.
We now consider the pooling equilibrium (3P2 ; 3P2). The sellers revenue from the equilibrium
(3P2 ; 3P2) is given by:
R3P2 = 289 LM   169 M2   13L+ 12 + 23M   109 L2.
Proposition 6 Sellers expected revenue from the equilibrium (3P2 ; 3P2) is maximised when L = 1=4,
M = 1=2 and H = 5=4, yielding x = 1=2 and R3P

2 = 5=8.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Proposition 5. Given the constrained maximisation problem,
we write down the corresponding Lagrangean and use the Kuhn-Tucker conditions. Solving, we get
L = 1=4 andM = 1=2: Hence, H = 12+2M
 L = 5=4. For these bid levels, x = 43M  23L = 1=2
and therefore R3P

2 = 5=8.
Finally, we consider the pooling equilibrium (3P3 ; 3P3). The sellers revenue from the equilibrium
(3P3 ; 3P3) is given by:
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R3P3 =M   2M2 + 12 .
Proposition 7 Sellers expected revenue from the equilibrium (3P3 ; 3P3) is maximised at M = 1=4
and H = 3=4, with any L < 1=4, yielding x = 1=2 and R3P

3 = 5=8.
Proof. The proof is straightforward. From the rst order condition, we obtain M = 1=4, in which
case H =M+1=2 = 3=4. Any L < M = 1=4 will thus be revenue-maximizing. In this case, x = 1=2
and R3P

3 = 5=8.
Observe that R3P

1 = R3P

2 = R3P

3 = R2S

. It is not really surprising if we carefully look at the
way the pooling strategies 3P1 , 3P2 and 3P3 have been constructed as extreme points of a separating
equilibrium in a G03 (discussed in the next subsection) and hence the corresponding equilibrium proles
(3P1 ; 3P1), (3P2 ; 3P2) and (3P3 ; 3P3) have the same payo¤s.
3.4 Separating Equilibrium in G03: A Simulation
One may be interested in constructing a separating equilibrium for any given G03. Following Denition
7, a separating strategy for G03 with three bid levels, L, M and H can be written using two cut-o¤s x

(= x1) and y
 (= x2) as:
3S =
8>>><>>>:
L if x  x
M if x < x  y
H if x > y
From Denition 8, we can construct a symmetric separating equilibrium using the above strategy.
The prole (3S ; 3S) is an equilibrium if the following conditions are met.
u1
 
L; 3S

x1=x
= u1
 
M;3S

x1=x
[indi¤erence at x]
u1
 
M;3S

x1=y
= u1
 
H;3S

x1=y
[indi¤erence at y]
u1
 
L; 3S

> u1
 
M;3S

if x1 < x [incentive constraint for the rst partition]
u1
 
M;3S

> u1
 
L; 3S

if x < x1 < y [rst incentive constraint for the second partition]
u1
 
M;3S

> u1
 
H;3S

if x < x1 < y [second incentive constraint for the second partition]
u1
 
H;3S

> u1
 
M;3S

if x1 > y [incentive constraint for the third partition]
u1
 
L; 3S
  u1 (0; 2) = 0 if x1  x [activation constraint] implying u1  L; 3Sx1=0  0 [partic-
ipation constraint]
0 < x < y < 1 [feasibility constraint]
As mentioned earlier, it is di¢ cult to analytically characterise such an equilibrium, that is, it is hard
to nd numerical values for x and y satisfying all the above constraints for any given values of L, M
and H. We thus present a simulation to indicate the existence of such an equilibrium for a xed set of
values of L, M and H. We start o¤ with L = 1=4 and M = 3=4; recall that these values maximise the
sellers revenue from the equilibrium (2S ; 2S) with two bid levels. Coupled with these values, we take
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a range of values for H between 5=4 (= 1:25) and 7=4 (= 1:75). Note that, for the bid levels L = 1=4,
M = 3=4, and H = 5=4, we have the pooling equilibrium (3P1 ; 3P1) and for L = 1=4, M = 3=4, and
H = 7=4, we have the pooling equilibrium (3P2 ; 3P2). We vary the value of H and nd values of x
and y satisfying all the equilibrium conditions and thereby nd a separating equilibrium in this case.
The following gure (Figure 2) shows the cuto¤s x and y in the separating equilibrium for di¤erent
values of H (between 1:25 and 1:75 on the horizontal axis).
Figure 2: Cuto¤s for separating equilibrium
In Figure 2, for each value of H (on the horizontal axis) we have two di¤erent dots: the lower curve
is for x while the upper curve is for y. Take, for example, three di¤erent levels of H: H = 7=5;
H = 3=2 and H = 8=5. The approximate numerical values are the following:
H = 7=5 H = 3=2 H = 8=5
x 0:734 0:782 0:801
y 0:873 0:853 0:842
Sellers Revenue 0:514 0:476 0:453
Note that at the two boundaries of the values of H, we have the pooling equilibria (3P1 ; 3P1) and
(3P2 ; 3P2) that can be interpreted as the two extremes of the separating equilibrium. The pooling
equilibrium (3P1 ; 3P1) is equivalent to a separating equilibrium with x = 1=2 and y = 1 in which H
is not played. Similarly, the pooling equilibrium (3P2 ; 3P2) is equivalent to a separating equilibrium
with x = y = 5=6 in which M is not played.
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We can nd the sellers revenue from such a separating equilibrium, as displayed in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Sellers revenue in pooling and separating
equilibrium
We observe that the revenue from any separating equilibrium here (revenue0 in Figure 3) is lower
than that of the pooling equilibrium (3P1 ; 3P1) which is equivalent to the equilibrium (2S ; 2S) with
two bid levels (revenue0 in Figure 3). Thus, we note that in this example, the seller strictly prefers the
pooling equilibrium (3P1 ; 3P1) to be played rather than the separating equilibrium for any su¢ ciently
high H where these two types of equilibria coexist. Also, by the same token, we observe that two bid
levels are (weakly) better than three for the seller. However, it is important to note that if the seller
had the choice of all three bid levels, L = 1=4; M = 3=4 and H > 5=4 would in all likelihood not be
his revenue-maximising choices. But nding the optimal choice of L; M and H is not easy, even with
simulations. We conjecture that perhaps the revenue from the equilibrium (2S ; 2S) in G02 is (weakly)
higher than that from any (pooling or separating) equilibrium in G03.
4 CONCLUSION
In a JEA for the wallet game with continuous bid levels, we have shown that a partition equilibrium
based on cut-o¤s in signals exists where the bidders use only weakly increasing partition strategies.
We have characterised these equilibria that can be pooling or separating. We illustrated a few such
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equilibria with two and three discrete bid levels. Under our partition equilibrium, sellers expected
revenue is strictly lower than that of the continuous JEA; the seller can, however, optimally choose
the bid levels to maximise the expected revenue. In this second best solution, the loss of revenue
compared to the JEA with continuous bid increments is not very high in percentage terms. Our paper
thus provides some understanding of how, once one xes the number of bid levels, bid levels should be
optimally chosen by the seller.
The rationale behind our result is relatively straightforward: given discrete bid levels, the partition
equilibrium leads players to bid up to the lowest discrete bid level toooften, and that reduces the
expected revenue compared to the continuous bidding JEA. With continuous bid levels the players can
easily infer (from the equilibrium strategies) their opponents signal and thus accurately calculate their
payo¤. However, with discrete bid levels, such an accurate inference is no longer possible and bidding
up to the low bid level more often provides a safety netunder such "uncertainty".
Our construction of equilibrium is somewhat similar to the recent work by Ettinger and Michelucci
(2016a) and Hernando-Veciana and Michelucci (2017) in a di¤erent environment: these results are all
related to a type of bunching which is somehow endogenously determined (in their papers, by jump
bids or by the choice of a 2-stage mechanism while in our work by the choice of the bid levels). Also,
Ettinger and Michelucci (2016b) analyses a simple example in which partitions can be induced by jump
bidding (Proposition 4 in their paper).
Needless to add, it is certainly an interesting question whether a general result for the set of equilibria
can be obtained in the games analysed in this paper for more than three bid levels. Future research
should characterise the set of all such partition equilibria for any number of discrete bids and other
(non-partition) equilibria, if any.
JEA with discrete bids may present other advantages to the auctioneer or to the bidders, such as,
reduced auction duration or an easier understanding of the rules that are particularly important issues
in online auctions. Thus, it may very well be the case that it becomes an even more attractive auction
format in the future, in which case more analysis should be devoted to this format than its continuous
bid counterpart.
Our research points out what the implications are of using a specic set of bid levels and how a
seller should optimally manipulate it. One may be interested in nding the optimal number of bid
levels for such an auction. Our simulation on three bid levels suggests that the optimal number of
bid levels (to maximise the sellers revenue) is perhaps small. One may also be interested in testing
this hypothesis in a suitably designed experiment. In addition, whether our partition equilibria are
played is also a question well suited for experimental testing. In the very simple set-up, with two or
three discrete bid levels, although multiple (separating or pooling) equilibria exist, our analysis provides
helpful indications regarding equilibrium selection. These are likely to be the next steps in our research.
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